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FOR [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]  
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1. Appreciate [REDACTED] comments of 13 February on Belorussian paper. We have following observations on 25X1X7 [REDACTED] memorandum.

2. Re para 2: Research has progressed considerably, both in depth and in scale, since Belorussian study completed last fall. About 26 divisions in the Western USSR have been studied to date. Are also working on GSFG. This additional research strengthens confidence in basic methodology and <sup>in</sup> judgment that Soviet divisions, in general, are smaller than previously estimated. Not all facts in yet. Review of all implications of new data incomplete. Clear however that former concepts of Warsaw Pact mobilization and deployment scheme and of Soviet ground force capabilities need serious reconsideration.

3. Re para 3: Point concerning TO&Es is well taken. We are undertaking thorough restudy of tank and motorized rifle division tables of equipment as represented by actual GSFG equipment holdings. These studies suggest that GSFG divisions have substantially less equipment than is called for by ~~our~~ former estimated wartime TE's. Moreover, at least 17 of the 26 tanks <sup>9</sup> and motorized divisions in Western USSR which we have examined thus far probably have ~~from~~ 600 to 1000 less vehicles than those in GSFG.

4. Re para 4: Question of mobilization of civilian vehicles is important. We agree that if Soviets were planning hostilities they would not hesitate to requisition any vehicles available. *However, they might carry out* Assumptions as to how such mobilization must be examined. For example, would they plan to procure vehicles in this way for assignment to the combat units of first-line divisions, or would such measures be limited to augmentation of theater and front-level transport units? How much time would be required to call up these vehicles and integrate them into the military organization? Considering the large numbers involved, i.e., up to 1000 per division, what is likelihood that many of the missing items are special purpose vehicles, not readily available from civilian sources? Aside from surplus artillery, we have not yet found evidence that Soviets have significant amounts of military equipment in depots in western USSR, so it difficult to see how any such shortages could be quickly made up.

5. Re para 5: We have not yet been able to study Soviet units in Far East to the same depth as those in the West. Evidently *25X1X7* has done some research on the equipment status of these units. We would be most interested in details.

6. Re para 6: Fully agree it would be wrong to *rely* ~~reply~~ on one source to exclusion of all others, and we are not

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doing so. However, [REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED] is currently providing most of significant new information on Soviet ground forces. As we see it, proper course of action is to adjust traditional methods to exploit fully potentialities [REDACTED] at same time striving for better exploitation of other sources, and full integration of all sources.

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7. [REDACTED] working closely on Soviet ground forces. Are in general agreement on validity of methodology and results to date.